

DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE CIVIL WAR  
Strategic Studies Group (SSG)  
SCENARIOS (VOL II)

GAINES MILL

June 27th, 1862

During McClellan's retreat from Richmond, known as the Seven Days, many battles and skirmishes were fought. One of the deadliest was fought on 27th June on Turkey Hill, near Gaines Mill.

Lee had expected McClellan to make a stand along the line of Powhite Creek. A. P. Hill sent in his lead brigade against the riflemen clustered around a building known as Gaines Mill and, after a short fire-fight, the enemy retreated. Lee was just thinking that the whole exercise had been far too easy when there was the sound of heavy firing and Hill's lead brigade came back at the double. Hill brought up three more brigades and, as Longstreet was arriving on the right, sent them in again. Again, the heavy firing and again the troops came back, wild-eyed and diminished in number.

Two miles east of Gaines Mill was a creek known as Boatswain Swamp. It flowed through a clear, boggy area around the front of the flat-topped Turkey Hill. Three separate lines of infantry, one above the other, were dug in and the crest was bristling with guns. Fitz-John Porter had three divisions and orders to hold the hill while the rest of the army retreated, and he and his men were determined to do just that.

Lee ordered Longstreet to make a demonstration on the right while he found out what had happened on the opposite wing where D. H. Hill and Jackson were supposed to be attacking and drawing defenders towards them. He found that Jackson had been delayed by taking a wrong road and had ordered Hill to delay his attack also. Lee ordered Ewell to go in on A. P. Hill's left in support while he sorted things out.

A. P. Hill's men, by this time, had had enough. "You need not go in" they said to Ewell's veterans. "We are whipped; you can't do anything". The veterans, unimpressed, went in at the charge. Again, the triple line of fire and the guns roared out, and such men as were still standing promptly ran back. The only solution seemed to be a general assault, all along the line. By 5 o'clock, Lee had all his men in position in a near semi-circular arc; in order from north to south were D. H. Hill, Ewell, Jackson, A. P. Hill and Longstreet. As the attack went in Hood's Texas brigade and Law's brigade punched through into the centre.

Porter had, by this time, been re-inforced with another

division and was feeling confident. McClellan had sent orders to hold on until dark and had indicated that he would be sending reinforcements. As the massed attack came in his men fired, reloaded and fired at incredible speed. Hood's and Law's brigades lost nearly a thousand men before they even reached Boatswain Swamp but they took their losses and kept coming and as they closed to bayonet range the Union centre panicked and broke. Fourteen guns and two complete regiments were captured at the point of breakthrough.

Still, this was not the same army that had scattered at First Bull Run. In the falling dusk the retreat was made successfully, covered by 6,000 unperturbed regulars under Sykes and two fresh brigades sent in as re-inforcements. Lee had captured 22 guns, over 2,000 prisoners and had control of the field and could thus claim a victory but he had lost 8,500 men in the process. Porter, including the 2,000 prisoners, had lost 6,837 but had held his position throughout the day. It is unlikely that he was unhappy with the result.

#### PLAYER'S NOTES

UNION. As the Union Commander at Gaines Mill Your main decisions will be in the employment of your reserves. Superb employment of reserve brigades was the keynote in Porter's defence at Gaines Mill, to emulate his success observe Lee's attacks as they develop and have reserves in position.

CONFEDERATE. The price of victory for the South is the blood of its best men. The only way to minimise your losses is to attack quickly and efficiently. Time is the most valued asset, establish A. P. Hill and Longstreet's attack orders and, if necessary, ride North to direct Jackson's men in an attempt to flank the Federal lines.

#### SCENARIO VARIANTS

(1). Jackson's sluggish arrival was the primary cause of Southern problems in this battle. Assume he had arrived earlier. Subtract 2 from the arrival time of Jackson's HQ and brigades 1-14 and 27; also change their likelihoods to 6.

(2). While Porter held off the majority of the Confederate Army, McClellan's Force of nearly 60,000 men was bluffed by a diversion orchestrated by Magruder and Huger with only 25,000 troops.

Repeated requests for reinforcements by Porter were denied, with only Slocum's Division (Taylor, Barton and Newton) and the Brigades of French and Meagher being released. Had these units arrived earlier, Porter's position would have been much less desperate. To simulate an earlier arrival, change the arrival turns of brigades 64-66 to 0 and 67-68 to 1. Change

the likelihood value for brigades 67-68 to 6.

## STONES RIVER (MURFREESBORO)

December 31st, 1862

On the evening of 30th December 1862, Rosecrans, advancing south-east from Nashville, met with Bragg at Stones River, in front of the town of Murfreesboro. Rosecrans had about 44,000 troops under the commands of Crittenden, Thomas and McCook. Bragg was defending with about 34,000 under the commands of Breckenridge, Polk and Hardee. Both commanders planned to attack the following morning and each had the same basic battle-plan - to attack the enemy right - but only Bragg achieved anything like his intent. Rosecrans had ordered a long line of campfires to be kindled beyond his right flank in order to trick Bragg into stripping his own right where the attack would land.

The trick worked in a sense - Bragg certainly moved troops there - but the effect was not what Rosecrans had intended. Ever methodical, he ordered his troops to attack immediately after breakfast. Bragg, however, had ordered his troops to attack before breakfast. Hardee ploughed through McCook's three divisions, caught by surprise while the coffee was still brewing. The divisions of Johnson and Davis immediately routed but Sheridan, commander of the third division, was made of sterner stuff. Polk's Corps was in the fight by now and Withers' division ran into a determined defence in a difficult tangle of rocks, scrub and trees. Three separate charges were repulsed.

Then Polk's second division, under Cheatham, arrived. Cheatham had the reputation of being the most profane man in the army. "Give 'em hell, boys!" he shouted. His corps commander was handicapped in this regard by being the Bishop of Louisiana but he was equal to the occasion. "Give them what General Cheatham says, boys!" he called. "Give 'em what General Cheatham says!" The boys did, and despite the significant amount of hell that came their way also, they forced Sheridan back.

Although the line was now bent at an angle of nearly ninety degrees, Sheridan's stand had given Rosecrans the time he needed to organise a defence. The left flank he anchored at the ford across Stones River. He then rode back and forth, directing the defence in person.

The critical point in the line was at the bend of the right angle - a four acre stand of cedars, known locally as the Round Forest and soon to be christened "Hell's Half-Acre" by the soldiers. On the high ground behind the trees, Rosecrans

concentrated his artillery. Bragg attacked repeatedly but in a piecemeal fashion, first with a Mississippi brigade, then with a Tennessee brigade, then with two brigades sent across by Breckinridge and finally with another two brigades from the source. The cotton field in front of Round Forest became a shambles of dead and dying men but the attacks could not withstand the concentrated firepower and none achieved the objective.

When the sun went down at 4.30 pm, Bragg had lost about 9,000 men but he was aware that his opponent had lost more, including over 3,000 captured in the first rush. He had achieved a decisive victory and he knew it. The only problem was, no-one had told Rosecrans.

Rosecrans certainly thought long and hard about retreat but in the end he decided to hold his position. Throughout New Year's day the two armies stared at each other while their commanders wondered what to do next.

On Jan. 2nd Bragg sent Breckinridge on an ill-advised assault against the Union right but Rosecrans had had a full day to re-organise his defences and the assault was beaten back in just over an hour, with more than 1700 casualties. The next day, Bragg received reports that his opponent was receiving new supplies and re-inforcements and he realised that he must withdraw.

Casualties for the battle had been heavy. The North had lost 13,249 (including 3717 captured) and the South 11,739 (including 2,500 captured). Tactically a bloody draw, the battle was a strategic victory for the Union. Rosecrans had taken Murfreesboro and Northern Tennessee.

#### SCENARIO VARIANTS

(1). Breckinridge was notified of Van Cleve's initial moves across Stones River and prepared for a Union attack. He was not told, however, of the Union Division's quick withdrawal to support Rosecrans' crumbling right flank. Consequently, Breckinridge failed to immediately comply with Bragg's orders to re-deploy across the river and support Polk. This failure is simulated in the scenario by the uncertain and late arrival of Breckinridge's corps HQ. Change the HQ arrival to 0, its likelihood to 7, and its location to 14,8 thus giving Bragg early access to this corps.

(2). Both Generals planned to attack their opponents right flank; Bragg got the jump on Rosecrans with McCown's dawn attack. The reverse could have been the case. To assume it was, re-position McCown's Division and the two Western Brigades of Cleburne's Division so they are just West and North of Hardee's HQ. Also move Wharton's cavalry south 2

hexes, Pegram's cavalry south 3 hexes. Change Breckinridge's arrival details as in Variant (1) above. For the North, Van Cleve and Wood's Divisions, with Morton's Pioneer Brigade should be deployed 1 hex distant from Breckinridge's positions, Wood on Van Cleve's right. Crittenden and his division commanders' orders must be changed to offensive, with Murfree Hill and Murfreesboro as objectives. Also move Crittenden's HQ to the East Bank.

#### PLAYERS NOTES

UNION. The Right flank will crumble almost immediately, stabilising it is your first priority. However, try to keep your options open with some of Crittenden's' Corps in case a quick thrust for Murfreesboro is possible later in the game; if not, a central reserve is always useful.

CONFEDERATE. As Bragg you must drive Hardee viciously into the Union right flank gaining ground before the enemy can react. Breckinridge can be moved to support Polk, or if not required, moved north to skirmish across the river at the Union left as Polk attacks.

#### GETTYSBURG

July 1st 3rd, 1863

The three-day battle fought at Gettysburg was not initially intended by either commander. It started when Heth (of Hill's corps) marched towards the town, intending to get shoes for his ill-shod Confederate soldiers from the Gettysburg factory. He ran into Buford with two brigades of cavalry and matters escalated from there. Two Union corps under Howard and Sickles arrived mid-morning and Heth's troops were badly cut up. More Confederate troops marched in and fighting increased. Early, marching down the Harrisburg road caught and routed Howard mid-afternoon and soon the whole Union force was in retreat. Several thousand were captured as they tried to funnel through the Gettysburg streets. Those who escaped capture rallied on Cemetery Hill, named for the cemetery on its summit.

Lee sent a message to Ewell on the left to attack the position if he thought there was a chance of success. This was the sort of message he was accustomed to send to Stonewall Jackson and it would undoubtedly have sent Jackson charging in to dislodge the badly shaken Union troops. But Jackson was two months in his grave and Ewell was uncertain and so did not attack. About 25,000 Confederate and 20,000 Union troops were involved on this first day, with casualties 8,000 and 9,000 respectively (half of the latter being prisoners).

During the night the rest of Meade's army, with the exception of Sedgwick's corps arrived and took up position. Meade was disposed on a curved ridge in the approximate shape of an inverted fish-hook with two hills, Little and Big Round Top, at the "eye". Lee's plan of attack was to feint with Ewell at the barb and attack with Longstreet at the Little Round Top end.

Little Round Top commanded the entire Union position and it was temporarily left uncovered but Brigadier General Warren, the Union army's chief engineer, acted on his own initiative to cover the hill. He was just in time, and a nasty little regimental level fight ensued, but he held on.

Longstreet had no great belief in the attack but he sent it in, from south to north: Hood at 4 pm, McLaws at 5 pm and Anderson at 6 pm. Apart from gobbling up a good proportion of two divisions unwisely posted in a forward salient the attack achieved little, which was unsurprising as by now it was 8 brigades attacking 22 in a solid defensive position. Sedgwick had arrived while the attack was in progress and was added to the defence.

At the other end of the line, Johnston and Early attacked at 7 pm and 8 pm respectively. They were not particularly successful either, although Early did manage to effect a lodgement on the point of the hook. By now Meade had his army together and had 80,000 men and 354 guns against Lee's 50,000 and 272.

The morning of the third day saw heavy fighting in the north where Ewell was lodged. The fight swayed to and fro but the Confederate troops were driven off by mid-morning.

The main assault was planned for the Union centre. Lee planned to use Pickett's division (about 4,600 men) and Heth's (about the same number but badly cut up on the first day) with a few others to bring the total up to about 11,000.

A heavy bombardment started about 1.00 pm which pounded the Union centre for over an hour and a half, but it caused only few casualties. At 2.30, the Union batteries ceased fire to make the Confederates think they were knocked out or out of ammunition and the ruse worked. The main attack came in. The Confederate army advanced in beautifully dressed lines across the three quarters of a mile of open ground. The Union artillery opened fire again and against the massed ranks it was impossible to miss. Some troops did succeed in reaching the Union position and even made a brief breakthrough but they were soon repulsed by the reserve. Barely half of those who set out returned, the attack having cost 5,000 casualties.

Remarkably, Confederate morale was not completely shattered and the army dug in grimly, awaiting Meade's counter-attack. But Meade had just seen the results of attacking an entrenched enemy and he didn't feel like trying it from the opposite point of view. Lee was ultimately able to retreat unmolested.

The battle was one of the bloodiest of the war with a total of over 50,000 casualties, 23,000 Union and 28,000 Confederate. Inside the Gettysburg cemetery was a sign, which had apparently escaped notice: "All persons found using firearms in these grounds will be prosecuted with the utmost rigor of the law."

#### PLAYERS NOTES (DAY 1 SCENARIO)

UNION. Placement of Reynold's HQ is critical, as directing the arriving Union units well is central to your success. A position near Gettysburg will give a good mix of communication and brigade control. Of course, the historical option is to lead from the front - and get yourself killed!

Remember your men can build entrenchments if stationary.

CONFEDERATE. To win, Lee (you!) will need to quickly deploy forward, using the South's numerical advantage before Union help arrives. You must take Gettysburg to have any chance of winning.

#### SCENARIO VARIANTS (DAY 1 SCENARIO)

(1). The Campaign Variant. A complete arrival schedule for all three days of the Gettysburg battle is already entered in the Day 1 scenario. The few changes necessary to create a three day game are listed below.

Enter the Day One page of the briefing screen and change the move column for turn 10 from 'END' to 'MOVE' by typing 1. Change the Union Army Commander to 'Meade'. The only changes to Meade's Day 2 scenario values are arrival = 4 and location = 14, 26. Change Lee's Army HQ as follows. Arrival = 4; offensive objectives = 12 and 22.

(2). Delayed Reinforcements. To simulate the uncertainty of arrival times for both sides reinforcements, subtract 2 from the arrival turn values for all units arriving between turns 6 and 13. Also change the likelihood value for these modified units to 5.

#### PLAYER'S NOTES (DAY 2 SCENARIO)

UNION. Correct management of reserves is central to winning Union tactics. Anticipate problems by keeping a constant watch on enemy movements and the condition of your men. Maintaining communications with your Corps Commanders is more important than getting involved in the trenches.

CONFEDERATE. Control for the confederate commander is

difficult due to his exterior lines of communication. Paying personal visits to your corps commanders' HQs is the best way of ensuring your plans run smoothly. Experience will show who needs a guiding hand (or you can check up on their ratings before the battle by using WARPLANô). To assure victory the South must break the Union lines and take at least one of the major "Big Point" objectives.

#### SCENARIO VARIANTS (DAY 2 SCENARIO)

(1). Longstreet may have placed Hood's division north of McLaws rather than the historical, more southern position. To simulate this, move Hood's brigades north, and change Hood's and McLaws' division HQ objectives to 18,16 and 19,22 respectively.

(2). The following brigades are included in the data base with a minimal chance of arrival due to their failure to be committed at Gettysburg. To improve their chances, change the likelihood values for the following brigades to 2. Bde Nos. 8,13,14,15,46,47,118,119,120.

#### CHICKAMAUGA

September 19th-20th, 1863

The Chickamauga Creek (chickamauga meaning "stagnant water" or, more sensationally, "river of death") flows approximately north-south into the Tennessee River, a few miles east of Chattanooga, through heavily wooded country. On 18th September the armies of Rosecrans - approximately 65,000 men in three corps under McCook, Thomas and Crittenden - and Bragg - a similar number in five corps divided into two wings under Polk and Longstreet who had just made a long rail journey from Virginia with about 12,000 men.

Bragg had planned to attack on 18th but delays meant that nothing happened, except that Rosecrans shifted his position northward to be nearer the Rossville Gap - his retreat route to Chattanooga in an emergency. On 19th the battle started at the north end of the line when Thomas moved to drive off what he thought was a single brigade. This quickly escalated into a slugging match with both sides pouring in more troops. Fighting spread south in the afternoon when Stewart's division, sent to help against Thomas, accidentally attacked a mile to the south. It hit Van Cleve's division and drove it back almost to Rosecrans' HQ at the Widow Glenn's house. Here, however, they met Reynolds' and Negley's divisions heading north and it was suddenly three divisions to one. Stewart was obliged to retreat back across the north-south, Lafayette Road.

As this attack was failing Hood, without orders, sent in the



divisions of Johnson and Law, immediately to the south. These met Davis' division which fell back. Again Widow Glenn's house was in view but again two divisions came to the rescue - this time those of Wood and Sheridan, and Johnson and Law too had to fall back beyond the road.

As the sun was setting Cleburne, at the far north end of the line, attacked and drove Thomas back almost a mile but he was still in good order as darkness fell. Throughout the night, the Confederate soldiers could hear their northern counterparts felling trees and hurriedly putting together barricades.

Rosecrans was not displeased with the situation. Although it had been close at times, his line had held together and there seemed to no reason why it should not continue to do so. Bragg also was quite pleased with the way things had gone, despite the unco-ordinated nature of the day's attacks, and he ordered Polk and Hill to attack at dawn.

Or rather, he thought he had so ordered, but the messenger could not find Hill in the darkness and by the time everything had been sorted out and the attack finally sent in, it was approaching ten o'clock. Rosecrans' soldiers had not been idle during this period of grace and the breastworks now had a grim and solid look about them. The series of divisional attacks which Bragg had ordered in the north were prosecuted with great enthusiasm but could not break the well-defended line.

The battle might well have continued in this manner until Bragg had worn his army down to nothing had not Rosecrans here made a catastrophic mistake. His aides reported to him a "gaping hole" between Reynolds' and Wood's divisions and, apparently forgetting his own dispositions, Rosecrans sent an order to Wood to "close up and support" Reynolds. Brannan was posted between the two and the only way Wood could support was to go around Brannan, which he did. There he met Thomas who said that Reynolds did not need support - he had just repulsed an attack by Stewart, but sent Wood, on his own (Thomas') responsibility, to reinforce the left. This created the "gaping hole" which had previously had no reality.

Longstreet, meanwhile, had been carefully massing four divisions for an attack and, as Wood's last units were leaving, they went in, leaping over the deserted barricades and charging into the vulnerable Union flanks. The army fell apart, a good third of it routing back to Chattanooga.

Rosecrans himself went with them to organise a defence which might well have been necessary had it not been for Thomas.

Thomas, in an action that was to earn him the nickname of

"The Rock of Chickamauga", refused to succumb to prevailing panic. Thus Kershaw, rushing in with two Confederate brigades, met with a bloody repulse. The Confederate army gave Thomas everything it had but, re-inforced by two brigades from Granger, who had been in reserve guarding the Rossville Gap, managed to more or less hold on until dark. They were obliged to leave many of the wounded behind and Bragg was to report a total of more than 8,000 prisoners. The Confederate victory had been at a terrible cost, however. Final casualties were 16,170 for the Union and 18,454 for the Confederacy, including in the latter case, 14,674 wounded. For the number of men involved, this was the bloodiest battle of the war.

#### PLAYER'S NOTES

UNION. The Union Player should aim to deploy his units to cover the roads leading to Rossville and McPhersons Gap. Thomas' corps will move towards Kelly's Farm and Brotherton. You should position the army HQ subordinate divisions south of Brotherton. Once this sector is organised, you may ride north and adjust Thomas' divisions. This is a confused battle, care must be taken to ensure that gaps large enough to allow an enemy penetration do not exist in your lines. The Rebels need to break your line to win. A stubborn defence will make the price too high.

CONFEDERATE. During the first day many confused clashes will result. As the South's Commander, you should try to keep the North off balance while planning for tomorrow's attack. During the night briefing (first AM turn, Day 2) you should issue orders to implement your plan. This is the only time when communications are possible to all commanders. Longstreet is your best commander, using him wisely is the key to success. Remember, piecemeal attacks by single divisions are a good way to lose lives, and the game.

#### SCENARIO VARIANTS

(1). Bragg appointed Leonidas Polk to command the South's Right Wing (represented by Polk's large corps). His performance in this role was sluggish at best! An alternative choice would have been D. H. Hill; a resourceful and experienced leader. To give Daniel Hill his chance, change Polk's HQ as follows; ID = D. H. Hill, Movement = 5, Leadership = 5, Staff = 5.

(2). Thomas had effective control of more units during this battle than Rosecrans. For a change in perspective we can put the Union Player in Thomas' shoes by swapping Thomas' Corps H. Q. name, position, arrival, movement, leadership, staff and troop strength values with those in the Army HQ, and

giving the First Corps defensive orders, with an objective of Viniard (10). Also all divisions with a corps assignment of 0 will need a value of 6, those with 6 must be switched to 0. These changes essentially put you in command of Thomas' Corps with Rosecrans as a subordinate corps commander.

#### CHATTANOOGA (MISSIONARY RIDGE)

November 23rd-25th, 1863

Holding Missionary Ridge during the siege of Chattanooga, Bragg had extremely strong position. Grant planned to use Thomas' four divisions in a holding action on the plain in front while Sherman, who had just made a devious detour through the mountains with four divisions, attacked Bragg's right flank along the ridge. Hooker was to attack Lookout Mountain on the left with three divisions and Howard held two divisions in reserve. Bragg was defending with seven divisions, with Cleburne holding the right flank and Stevenson on Lookout Mountain.

On 23rd November, Thomas was ordered to move out of the city and take up a position half-way across the plain. Thomas' men had heard through the grapevine that Grant had doubts about their morale after Chickamauga and were on their best behaviour. They marched out with the precision of a review and the Confederate outposts on Orchard Knob and Bushy Knob were enjoying the show when suddenly, the trumpets blew and they were swamped in a rush of soldiers.

On 24th, Sherman attacked smoothly on Bragg's right, brushing aside all opposition, until he held the high ground. In late afternoon, contemplating the next day's attack along the ridge, he suddenly realised that he wasn't on the ridge at all. He had been tricked by the unfamiliar terrain and he was on an isolated hill, separated from the main ridge. He dug in, realising that he had everything to do again on the morrow.

Meanwhile, Hooker had been attacking Lookout Mountain. On the steep and rocky terrain the two Confederate brigades put up a good showing but against the pressure of three divisions they could only fight a delaying action. During the night they were pulled back to Missionary Ridge by Bragg who felt that they would be more use in the defence there. Thomas did nothing this day.

On 25th, virtually nothing went as Grant planned. In the early morning the American flag could be seen flying on the summit of Lookout Mountain and Grant waited confidently for Hooker to advance on Rossville and Bragg's left wing. He waited some time however, for the terrain was extremely

difficult and there was a delay of over four hours while Hooker got into position.

Sherman, at the other end of the line, had run into a wall. Cleburne's single division held off attacks by Sherman's four. Grant sent Howard's two divisions over to help and Cleburne drove them off too. Sherman attacked repeatedly and with vigour but he simply could not budge Cleburne, entrenched on the high ground.

At 3.30 pm with Hooker in position at one end and Sherman stalled at the other Grant looked doubtfully at Bragg's triple line of entrenchments, at the base of the ridge, midway up, and on the crest, and ordered Thomas to take those at the base. Thomas' men were still annoyed that their morale might be called into question and they took the trenches at a rush.

Once there, however, they found themselves subject to plunging fire from the trenches above. They could not stay there, only go back or forward. They elected to go forward. A wild spirit caught hold of them and the entire four divisions charged up the steep slope. It couldn't really be done but, aided by Bragg's poor siting of his entrenchments which left large sections of the hill in defilade, they swept over the summit and the Confederate line broke and scattered.

Thomas' men had proved to everyone's satisfaction that their morale was as good as ever. Total casualties were 5824 for the North and 6667 for the South, including 4146 captured or missing. Years later, someone remarked to Grant that Bragg must have thought his position impregnable. Grant smiled wryly. "Well" he said, "it was impregnable."

#### SCENARIO VARIANTS

(1). The pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry was destroyed by floods before P. J. Osterhaus' division could cross, consequently this division fought with Hooker rather than with Sherman as originally intended. Assume the bridge held. Change the corps assignment of Osterhaus' division to 8 (Sherman) and re-position his brigades (81 and 82) along the road to Shermans Bridge. Change the division objectives to 22 and 18 and the brigade objectives to 22.

(2). Prior to the battle Sherman issued orders for Hooker to move north across Browns Ferry and through Chattanooga, rather than fight his way over Lookout Mountain and across Chattanooga Creek in order to reach Missionary Ridge. This plan was also thwarted by the destruction of Browns Ferry. Assume it could be accomplished. Position Hooker's corps and brigades in Chattanooga, change corps and divisional objectives to 5 and 6 and brigade objectives to 5.

#### PLAYER'S NOTES

UNION. You are in an excellent position to carry out a double envelopment of Missionary Ridge and thereby minimise the casualties incurred during the final assault on the Rebel breastworks. Wait until one or preferably both flanks are turned before loosing Thomas' Corps for the knockout blow in the centre.

CONFEDERATE. The South is outnumbered and must conserve forces whenever possible. Give ground wherever necessary on Lookout Mountain, and try to re-deploy back to Missionary Ridge by the morning of Day 2. A balance must be struck between holding the northern flank and weakening the centre.